Continuing to pursue a research direction that we already explored in connection with Gödel-Dummett logic and Ruspini partitions, we show here that Lukasiewicz logic is able to express the notion of pseudo-triangular basis of fuzzy sets, a mild weakening of the standard notion of triangular basis. En route to our main result we obtain an elementary, logic-independent characterisation of triangular bases of fuzzy sets.
Prologue.
In this paper, by a fuzzy set we always mean a function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with [0, 1] ⊆ R, the real unit interval. Throughout, we fix an integer n > 0, and a finite, non-empty family P = {f 1 , . . . , f n } of fuzzy sets. We further always assume that each f i ∈ P is a continuous function with respect to the usual (Euclidean) topology of [0, 1] . We address here the general question, what is the logical content of the family of fuzzy sets P . By way of motivation, let us think of the real unit interval [0, 1] as the normalised range of values of a physical observable, say temperature. Then each f i ∈ P can be viewed as a means of assigning a truth value to a proposition about temperature in some many-valued logic L . Had one no information at all about such propositions, one would be led to identify them with propositional variables X i , subject only to the axioms of L . Intuitively, however, the set P does encode information about X 1 , . . . , X n . For example, consider P = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 } as in Fig. 1 , and say f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 provide truth values for the propositions X 1 = "The temperature is low", X 2 = "The temperature is medium", and X 3 = "The temperature is high", respectively. The shape of the functions in P intuitively tells us that it is never the case that the observed temperature is both low and high. More generally, at an intuitive level it is clear that P encodes a body B of knowledge about the specific application domain (here, about temperature). How can we make this intuition precise?
If L has a conjunction ∧ interpreted by minimum, the proposition X 1 ∧ X 3 has 0 as its only possible truth value, i.e. it is a contradiction. The chosen set P then leads us to add extra-logical axioms to L -e.g. ¬(X 1 ∧ X 3 ), where ¬ is a negation connective-in an attempt to express the fact that one cannot observe both a high and a low temperature at the same time. More generally, we see that P implicitly encodes a theory Θ P over the pure logic L -a theory being a family of formulae required to hold, thought of as extra-logical axioms. Crucially, the theory Θ P is determined independently of the specifics of the available connectives. Set Θ P = {ϕ(X 1 , . . . , X n ) | ϕ(f 1 (x), . . . , f n (x)) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]} .
(Here, ϕ is a formula of L over the variables X 1 , . . . , X n , and ϕ(r 1 , . . . , r n ) denotes the evaluation of ϕ at (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ [0, 1] n .) Under the sole assumption that L has a sound [0, 1]-valued semantics, it is easy to show that Θ P as in (*) is a (deductively closed) theory over L ; see Lemma 5.1 below.
In traditional terminology, the axioms of the logic L (along with their deductive consequences) are to be thought of as analytic truths, which hold true by virtue of their form alone, independently of the circumstances. Analytic truths are the subject matter of logic proper; however, by their very nature, they carry no information about "the world": whichever analytic truth one utters about temperature, one can equally well utter about, say, pressure. By contrast, the additional formulae, or extra-logical axioms, that feature in a theory are to be thought of as synthetic truths-assertions that are truthful only within a specific domain of application, by virtue of properties of that domain. So, for example, in dealing with a certain (ideal) gas one may wish to assert as a physical (hence extra-logical) truth that the product of the volume and the pressure is constant at constant temperature. But there is of course no way of deducing such a statement from the axioms of classical logic: a world in which this specific law fails is conceivable, i.e. is logically consistent, and hence whatever the truth expressed by the law, it is a factual, or contingent, or synthetic truth. The completeness theorem then tells us that the statement in question is not formally derivable from the axioms of classical logic, because it has a counter-model, namely, the possible world wherein it fails. In this precise sense, logic can teach us nothing (factual): good grades in logic won't help with your physics class.
In light of the foregoing, we now see how to relate the two statements:
(S1) P determines a theory Θ P over L , and (S2) P encodes a body B of knowledge about the specific application domain.
Indeed, Θ P is none other than a verbalisation of B: an exposition of B in formulae, so to speak. But while (S1) does provide the desired clarification of the intuition (S2), Θ P may end up being a mere approximation to B; after all, the linguistic resources offered by L are limited. The differential relationship between acceleration and velocity, for example, is hardly exactly expressible within most formal system that go under the name of "logics".
In this paper we are concerned with one instance of the general problem of making explicit the extra-logical information implicitly encoded by P . In a previous paper [9] (see also [8] ), we addressed and solved this problem in case the background logic L is Gödel-Dummett (infinite-valued propositional ) logic [13, Chapter 4] , and P is assumed to be a Ruspini partition, i.e. such that n i=1 f i (x) = 1 for each x ∈ [0, 1]. There, we proved that Gödel-Dummett logic can only capture the semantical notion of Ruspini partition up to an equivalence relation that we determined exactly. Here, we address the problem of identifying the synthetic, factual content of triangular bases of fuzzy sets, a notion strictly stronger than Ruspini partitions. Such triangular bases commonly occur in applications. The set P = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 } provides an example; please see Definition 2.2 below for details. Throughout the paper, we will take L to be Lukasiewicz (infinite-valued propositional ) logic [5] ; background is provided in Section 4. It is well known that Lukasiewicz logic is able to express addition of real numbers exactly, and so does axiomatise Ruspini partitions exactly. We shall prove in Theorem II of Section 6 the stronger result that Lukasiewicz logic axiomatises the notion of triangular bases of fuzzy sets almost exactly; specifically, the logic axiomatises pseudo-triangular bases (see Definition 2.2), a mild weakening of triangular bases. It will transpire that the reason why the latter cannot be characterised exactly is that the logic does not express (affine) linearity, though, as mentioned, it does express addition. Besides a fair amount of standard machinery in Lukasiewicz logic, the proof of Theorem II uses Theorem I, which we prove in Section 3. Here we characterise pseudo-triangular bases of fuzzy sets by elementary properties of the set of functions P which strengthen the Ruspini condition. In the final Section 7 we discuss further research, and connections with previous work on the algebraic semantics of Lukasiewicz logic.
Properties of fuzzy sets.
Fuzzy sets are often required to satisfy additional conditions that are deemed useful for the specific application under consideration. Here is a popular one that we already mentioned in the Prologue, and is usually traced back
We further say that P is 2-overlapping if for all x ∈ [0, 1] and all triples of Figure 1 shows a family of fuzzy sets which is both Ruspini and 2-overlapping. The Ruspini and the 2-overlapping conditions (1-2) apply to a family of fuzzy sets. In the literature, several properties applicable to a single fuzzy set have been considered too. One of these we are assuming throughout, as stated at the beginning; namely, continuity. Further, a fuzzy set f :
for all y ∈ [0, 1] with y = x, we say that f is strongly normal. The fuzzy sets f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 depicted in Figure 1 are strongly normal. The last property we wish to consider is convexity. Following [11, p. 25] , it is common to consider a weaker form of convexity than the classical one. The fuzzy set f :
and it is strictly min-convex if
We shall make crucial use of a localised version of min-convexity in our results. Let us call S f = {x ∈ [0, 1] | f (x) > 0} the support of f . We say f is minconvex on its support if (3) holds for each x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that [x, y] ⊆ S f . We define the notion of strict min-convexity of f on its support in the same manner, mutatis mutandis. A min-convex fuzzy set is shown in Figure 2 (a); a non-min-convex fuzzy set is shown in Figure 2 
Moreover, f is strictly min-convex if, and only if, for any 0 ≤ x < z < y ≤ 1
Proof. This is a straightforward verification.
There is one last property of fuzzy sets that we consider in this paper:
Definition 2.1. A finite family P = {f 1 , . . . , f n } of fuzzy sets is separating if for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], with x = y, {f 1 (x), . . . , f n (x)} = {f 1 (y), . . . , f n (y)}.
It may be remarked that many families of fuzzy sets that have been investigated in the literature, or have been used in implementations, indeed are separating -the set in Figure 1 being a typical instance. We shall see in due course that the property is a crucial feature of such examples, cf. Theorem II below.
Instead of asking that P (or its members) satisfy a given general property such as the ones above, we can decide to restrict the choice of fuzzy sets to a prototypical class of functions. So, for example, a fuzzy system might use sigmoid, or triangular, or trapezoidal functions only. In the case of triangular functions, moreover, it is common to require that the various fuzzy sets fit together nicely, as in the following definition that is central to our paper. Definition 2.2. A finite family P = {f 1 , . . . , f n } of continuous fuzzy sets is a pseudo-triangular basis if there exist 0 = t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n−1 < t n = 1 such that (up to a permutation of the indices) for each i = 1, . . . , n − 1
Further, P is a triangular basis if the following condition holds in place of d ).
See Figure 3 for an example of a pseudo-triangular basis of fuzzy sets. Remark 1. It is straightforward to prove that a finite family {f 1 , . . . , f n } of continuous fuzzy sets is a triangular basis if, and only if, there exist real numbers 0 = t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n−1 < t n = 1 such that (up to a permutation of the indices)
The conditions in Definition 2.2 are somewhat more involved in order to capture instances that are not locally linear, as in Figure 3 .
Characterisation of pseudo-triangular bases of fuzzy sets.
We define a continuous map
We write ran T P = T P ([0, 1]) for the range of T P .
Recall 3 that the fundamental simplex in R n , denoted by ∆ n , is the convex hull of the standard basis of R n ; the latter is denoted {e 1 , . . . , e n }. In symbols,
n , is the collection of all faces of ∆ n having dimension not greater than 1. We say ran T P is a Hamiltonian path if there is a permutation π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} such that
Theorem I. The following are equivalent.
i ) P is a pseudo-triangular basis. ii ) P is a 2-overlapping Ruspini partition and each f i ∈ P is strongly normal, min-convex, and strictly min-convex on its support. iii ) The map
n is injective, and ran T P is a Hamiltonian path on ∆
n .
Proof. Labels a), b), c), and d ) in this proof refer to the items in Definition 2.2.
i ) ⇒ iii ). By b) and c), we immediately obtain that
By a), there exist 0 = t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n = 1 such that, up to a permutation of the indices,
Let us fix an interval [t i , t i+1 ], for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. By (6-7) and b),
Again by (7), since T P is continuous, using the intermediate value theorem we obtain
Thus,
that is, ran T P is a Hamiltonian path.
It remains to show that T P is injective. If not (absurdum hypothesis), there exist x, y ∈ [0, 1], with x < y such that T P (x) = T P (y). Then (8) 
n , (f 1 (x), . . . , f n (x)) has at most 2 non-zero coordinates, for each x ∈ [0, 1], that is, P is 2-overlapping. By the definition of Hamiltonian path, ran T P contains all vertices of ∆ (1) n . Thus, each f i is normal. Since, moreover, T P is injective, each f i is strongly normal.
Up to a permutation of the indices, there exist t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n−1 < t n , such that T P (t i ) = e i , for each i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, by the intermediate value theorem we have T P ([t i , t i+1 ]) ⊇ Conv {e i , e i+1 }, i = 1, . . . , n − 1. But since T P is injective it follows at once that
Now (9) implies, for each i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1},
Indeed, (12) is immediate, and (10) follows from the injectivity of
The proof of (11) is analogous. Similar arguments show that,
We can now show that f i is min-convex, for each i = 1, . . . , n. By Lemma 2.1 it suffices to show that whenever 0 ≤ x < y < z ≤ 1, and f i (x) > f i (y), then f i (y) ≥ f i (z). The cases i = 1 and i = n are trivial; assume 1 < i < n. Since f i (x) > 0, we have t i−1 < x < t i+1 by (12) . If x ≥ t i , by (11) and (12) , f i (y) ≥ f i (z). If x < t i , then, by (10), y > t i . Using (11) (12) , we obtain
A similar argument using (10-12) and Lemma 2.1 proves that each f i is strictly minconvex on its support.
ii ) ⇒ i ). Since each f i is strongly normal, and P is Ruspini, there exist 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n−1 < t n ≤ 1 such that (up to a permutation of the indices) for each i = 1, . . . , n we have
Moreover, t 1 = 0, t n = 1. For suppose t 1 > 0 (absurdum hypothesis). Then
By Lemma 2.1, f j is not min-convex, a contradiction. The argument for j > i is analogous, and condition b) is proved.
From b) and the hypothesis that P is Ruspini, we immediately obtain c).
It remains to prove d ). By (13), f i (t i ) = f i+1 (t i+1 ) = 1 and f i (t i+1 ) = f i+1 (t i ) = 0. Moreover, since f i and f i+1 are strongly normal, and P is Ruspini, using b) we have
Since f i , f i+1 are continuous, by the intermediate value theorem they are surjective when restricted to [t i , t i+1 ]. Suppose now that there exist y < z ∈ (t i , t i+1 ) such that f i (y) = f i (z) (absurdum hypothesis). Observe that, by (14) , [y, z] is contained in the support of f i and f i+1 . Pick w ∈ (y, z). If f i (w) ≤ f i (y), then, by Lemma 2.1, f i is not strictly min-convex on its support, a contradiction. If f i (w) > f i (y), then, by c),
Thus f i+1 is not strictly min-convex on its support, a contradiction. Therefore, f i and f i+1 are injective, and d ) holds.
Intermezzo: Lukasiewicz logic.
Lukasiewicz (infinite-valued propositional ) logic is a non-classical manyvalued system going back to the 1920's, cf. the early survey [14, §3] , and its annotated English translation in [23, pp. 38-59] . The standard modern reference for Lukasiewicz logic is [5] , while [19] deals with topics at the frontier of current research. Lukasiewicz logic can also be regarded as a member of a larger hierarchy of many-valued logics that was systematised by Petr Hájek in the late Nineties, cf. [13] . Let us recall some basic notions.
Let us fix once and for all the countably infinite set of propositional variables:
Let us write ⊥ for the logical constant falsum, ¬ for the unary negation connective, and → for the binary implication connective. (Further derived connectives are introduced below.) The set Form of (well-formed) formulae 5 is defined exactly as in classical logic over the language {⊥, ¬, →}.
The Lukasiewicz calculus is defined by the five 6 axiom schemata
with modus ponens as the only deduction rule. Provability is defined exactly as in classical logic; α means that formula α is provable. We write L to denote Lukasiewicz logic. The logical constant verum ( ), the conjunction (∧), the disjunction (∨), and the biconditional (↔) are defined as in Table 1 . From the definition of disjunction one sees that (A3) indeed asserts the commutativity of disjunction. Other common derived connectives are reported in the same table, with their definition. Some remarks are in order. Using the biconditional, one defines formulae α, β ∈ Form to be logically equivalent just in case α ↔ β holds. The connectives and ⊕ are then De Morgan dual: α ⊕ β is logically equivalent to ¬(¬α ¬β), and α β is logically equivalent to ¬(¬α ⊕ ¬β). These connectives, known as the strong disjunction (⊕) and strong conjunction ( ) of L , play a central rôle both in Hájek's treatment of many-valued logics [13] , and in Chang's algebraisation of L via MV-algebras [5] . They are not idempotent, in the sense that α ⊕ α and α are not logically equivalent: only the implication α → α ⊕ α is provable; dual considerations apply to . Conjunction (∧) and disjunction (∨) also are De Morgan dual, but they are idempotent; in fact, they are sometimes called the lattice connectives because they induce the structure of a distributive
But not, or Difference - lattice in the algebraic semantics of L . Finally, the connective is the coimplication, i.e. the dual to →.
If S ⊆ Form is any set of formulae, one writes S α to mean that α is provable in Lukasiewicz logic, under the additional set of assumptions S. When this is the case, one says that α is a syntactic consequence of S. Since each one of (A0-A4) is a principle of classical reasoning, and since modus ponens is a classically valid rule of inference, each formula provable in L is a theorem of classical propositional logic. The converse is not true: most notably, it is not hard to show that the tertium non datur law, α ∨ ¬α, is not provable in Lukasiewicz logic. In fact, it can be shown that the addition of α ∨ ¬α as a sixth axiom schema to (A0-A4) yields classical logic.
By a theory in Lukasiewicz logic one means any set of formulae that is closed under provability, i.e. is deductively closed. For any S ⊆ Form, the smallest theory that extends S exists: it is the deductive closure S of S, defined by α ∈ S if, and only if, S α. A theory Θ is consistent if Θ = Form, and inconsistent otherwise. A theory Θ is axiomatised by a set S ⊆ Form of formulae if it so happens that Θ = S ; and Θ is finitely axiomatisable if S can be chosen finite.
Let us now turn to the [0, 1]-valued semantics. An atomic assignment, or atomic evaluation, is an arbitrary function w : Var → [0, 1]. Such an atomic evaluation is uniquely extended to an evaluation of all formulae, or possible world, i.e. to a function w : Form → [0, 1], via the compositional rules:
It follows by trivial computations that the formal semantics of derived connectives is the one reported in Table 2 . Tautologies are defined as those formulae that evaluate to 1 under every evaluation. Let us write α to mean that the formula α ∈ Form is a tautology. The relativisation of this concept to theories leads to the notion of semantic consequence. Let S ⊆ Form be any subset, and let Θ = S be its associated theory. Given α ∈ Form, the assertion S α states that any evaluation w : Form → [0, 1] that satisfies w(S) = {1} -meaning that w(β) = 1 for each β ∈ S -must also satisfy w(α) = 1. When this is the case, we say that α is a semantic consequence of S. We write S for the set of semantic consequences of S.
It is an exercise to check that L enjoys the generalised validity theorem: for any S ⊆ Form and any α ∈ Form, if S α then S α. (For a proof, see [5, 4.5.1] .) On the other hand, it is a non-trivial theorem that L is complete 7 with respect to the many-valued semantics above: hence α if, and only if, α, for any α ∈ Form. The first proof of this appeared in [20] ; see also [5, 4.5 
All of the above can be adapted in the obvious manner to the finite set Var n = {X 1 , . . . , X n }, in which case one speaks of Lukasiewicz logic over n (propositional ) variables, denoted L n . The results in the sequel are formulated for L n , though they do admit extension to L . Although, strictly speaking, one should introduce fresh consequence relation symbols n and n for L n , we will avoid this pedantry and use and instead. We will write Form n for the set of formulae whose propositional variables are contained in Var n .
From functions to logic: theories induced by fuzzy sets.
The following is a detailed definition of Θ P as in (*).
(2) The theory Θ P ⊆ Form n associated with P is defined as the set of formulae ϕ ∈ Form n such that µ(ϕ) = 1 whenever the assignment µ : Form n → [0, 1] is realised by P .
We record a simple fact for later use.
Lemma 5.1. The set Θ P ⊆ Form n as in Definition 5.1 is indeed a theory, i.e. a deductively closed set of formulae.
Proof. For suppose ϕ ∈ Form n is such that Θ P ϕ. Since Lukasiewicz logic is sound with respect to [0, 1]-valued assignments [5, 4.5.1], it follows that Θ P ϕ. If now the assignment µ is realised by P , by definition it evaluates to 1 each formula in Θ P ; from Θ P ϕ we have µ(ϕ) = 1, too, and therefore ϕ ∈ Θ P . Hence Θ P is a theory.
Remark 2. Observe that the theory Θ P in Lemma 5.1 is always consistent: no assignment at all µ :
Remark 3. Notice that, as stated in the Prologue, Lemma 5.1 would hold (by the above proof) for any [0, 1]-valued logic that satisfies the minimal requirement of soundness with respect to [0, 1]-valued assignments. Also note that the finiteness of P plays no rôle in the proof. In conclusion, any given collection of fuzzy sets gives rise to specific theory in any given [0, 1]-valued logic.
For an application of Remark 3 in the context of theories of vagueness, the interested reader may consult [16] .
6. How to axiomatise a pseudo-triangular basis of fuzzy sets.
In this section we throughout work with Lukasiewicz logic over n propositional variables, L n . We prepare the following formulae in Form n .
. . , n, and |i − j| = 1,
. . , n, and |i − j| > 1.
We further set A = {ρ} ∪ {α ij | i, j = 1, . . . , n, and |i − j| = 1} ∪ ∪ {β ij | i, j = 1, . . . , n, and |i − j| > 1} .
By the 1-set of a formula ϕ ∈ Form n we mean the following subset of [0, 1] n :
where µ x : Form n → [0, 1] is the unique evaluation extending the assignment X 1 → x 1 , . . . , X n → x n . The 1-set of a finite set of formulae {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m }, moreover, is defined to be the 1-set of the formula ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ m , or equivalently, the intersection of the 1-sets of ϕ i , i = 1, . . . , m.
To prove our Theorem II, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 6.1. The 1-set of the set of formulae A is precisely the Hamiltonian path
Conv {e i , e i+1 }. Proof. For n = 3 the proof is provided by Figures 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) .
(a) 1-set of (17) .
(b) 1-set of (16) (17) .
(c) 1-set of (15) (16) (17) . In general, let I 1 be the 1-set of (17) . Then (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ I 1 if, and only if, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that |i − j| > 1, 1 − min{x i , x j } = 1, that is, if, and only if, one between x i and x j equals 0. Thus, if F i is the 2-dimensional face of [0, 1] n containing both e i and e i+1 , we have I 1 = i=1 n−1 F i . Let now I 2 be the 1-set of (16) (17) . Then, (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ I 2 if, and only if, I 2 ⊆ I 1 , and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, 1 − max{0,
Finally, let I 3 be the 1-set of (15) (16) (17) , i.e. of A. Then, (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ I 3 if, and only if, I 3 ⊆ I 2 , and min{1, x 1 +· · ·+x n } = 1. Thus,
Theorem II. The following are equivalent.
i ) P is a pseudo-triangular basis of fuzzy sets. ii ) P is separating, and Θ P = A .
Proof. i) ⇒ ii).
It is immediate to check that a pseudo-triangular basis of fuzzy sets is separating. We next show that A ⊆ Θ P . To this aim, let µ : Form n → [0, 1] be an assignment realised by P at x. By Definition 5.1:
for i, j = 1, . . . , n, and |i − j| = 1;
for i, j = 1, . . . , n, and |i − j| > 1.
By c) in Definition 2.2, µ(ρ) = 1, and µ(α ij ) = 1 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n such that |i − j| = 1. By b) in Definition 2.2, for |i − j| > 1, at least one between f i (x) and f j (x) equals 0. Thus, µ(β ij ) = 1, for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, and |i − j| > 1. Hence A ⊆ Θ P , indeed. By Lemma 5.1 we therefore have A ⊆ Θ P .
It remains to prove that A ⊇ Θ P . Let I A be the 1-set of A. By Lemma 6.1 we have
On the other hand, by Theorem 3 we have
Hence I A = ran T P by (18) (19) . If now ϕ ∈ Θ P , and I ϕ is its 1-set, then each assignment realised by P at some point of [0, 1] satisfies ϕ by the definition of Θ P , and therefore we have I ϕ ⊇ I A . By the definition of semantic consequence we may rewrite the latter inclusion as ϕ ∈ A . Since A is a finite set, by the Hay-Wójcicki's Theorem [5, 4.6.7] we conclude A = A , as was to be shown. ii) ⇒ i) That P is separating is evidently equivalent to the fact that the map
n is injective, so let us assume the latter for the rest of this proof. Writing again I A for the 1-set of A, by Lemma 6.1 we have (18) . Hence it suffices to show ran
for then Theorem I implies that P is a pseudo-triangular basis of fuzzy sets.
To prove the inclusion ran T P ⊆ I A , let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ ran T P . Then the assignment µ(X i ) = x i is realised by P at x, and thus µ Θ P by the definition of Θ P . Since Θ P = A by assumption, and since A is finite, by the Hay-Wójcicki's Theorem [5, 4.6 .7] we have Θ P = A , and therefore in particular µ A.
To prove the converse, let us set R = ran T P ⊆ I A . Assume by way of contradiction that R ⊂ I A , i.e. there is x ∈ I A such that x ∈ R. Therefore, if we set D = I A \ {x}, we have R ⊆ D. But since R is the continuous image of a connected set, namely [0, 1], it is itself connected, whereas by (18) we see that D has two connected components D 1 and D n containing e 1 and e n , respectively. Hence either R ⊆ D 1 , or R ⊆ D n . Say the former holds, without loss of generality, so that e n ∈ R. Next observe that R must be a closed set in the metric space I A , the latter endowed with the metric d(·, ·) induced by the Euclidean distance of [0, 1] n : indeed, this is a special case of the well-known closed map lemma, stating that a continuous map from a compact space to a Hausdorff (in particular, metric) space must be closed (=must send closed sets to closed sets). Hence e n is an interior point of I A \ R, and thus there is an open set U ≡ U (e n , ) = {x ∈ I A | d(e n , x) < }, for some real number > 0, such that U ∩ R = ∅. For an integer k ≥ 1, let us consider the formula in Form n
Further, let I ϕ k be the 1-set of ϕ k . Direct inspection shows that
Then a simple computation shows
By (21) we infer at once
On the other hand, the assignment µ : Form n → [0, 1] such that µ(X n ) = 1 and µ(X i ) = 0, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, satisfies µ(ϕ k0 ) = 0 and evaluates each formula in A to 1, because {e n } ∈ I A . Hence ϕ k0 ∈ A , and therefore
by soundness [5, 4.5.1]. Now (22) (23) yield the desired contradiction Θ P = A .
Epilogue.
How can we generalise the results above to situations in which we are concerned with several physical observables? Here, we are to deal with fuzzy sets . . , n} is the Schauder basis of Σ. We then define the family P of fuzzy sets to be a triangular basis if is satisfies P = H Σ for some triangulation Σ of [0, 1] n . It is an exercise to check that this definition agrees with Definition 2.2 in case n = 1. It is also easy to see that Schauder bases are Ruspini partitions. Unfortunately, however, no elementary characterisation of Schauder bases analogous to our Theorem I is known. Nonetheless, abstract characterisations of Schauder bases have been obtained using homology and other mathematical tools [15] . This leads to the notion of abstract Schauder bases, the higher-dimensional analogue of pseudotriangular bases of fuzzy sets, originally introduced in the last-named author's Ph.D. thesis. Remarkably, Lukasiewicz logic does express the notion of abstract Schauder basis, so that it is possible to formulate a higher-dimensional analogue of our Theorem II. For the algebraic treatment of abstract Schauder bases in the language of lattice-groups-structures closely related to MV-algebras, the algebraic semantics of Lukasiewicz logic-the interested reader is referred to [15, 18, 17] , and to the references therein. For an account of bases in the context of MV-algebras and Lukasiewicz logic themselves, see [19] .
Lukasiewicz and Gödel-Dummett logics are part of a hierarchy of systems based on triangular norms; see [13] . It has been argued that the hierarchy, together with its generalisations, provides a framework that makes precise the notion of mathematical fuzzy logic [6, 7] . The proof of Lemma 5.1 above, though easy, does say that the programme of axiomatising properties of fuzzy sets by means of a [0, 1]-valued logic makes sense at a very general level. It is important to stress that, to carry this programme out, one needs a reasonably complete set of analogues of standard notions in mathematical logic 8 -e.g. deductively closed theories and axiomatisations. Mathematical fuzzy logic, in the sense above, does provide such analogues. It is therefore possible, at least in principle, to develop this line of research extensively. 9 The benefits would surely be equally distributed between the theoretical and the application-oriented parties.
One knows more about, say, Gödel-Dummett logic as a theoretical many-valued system, if one knows exactly to what extent the logic is capable of expressing the semantical notion of Ruspini partition. And one can make more conscious design choices in facing, say, the problem of developing a specific fuzzy-based control system, if one has that very same information about Gödel-Dummett logic available.
